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Abstract. The rapid development and increasing complexity of modern socio-
technical systems suggest an urgent need for systemic safety analysis approaches
because traditional linear models cannot cope with this complexity. In the avi-
ation safety literature, among systemic accident and incident analysis methods,
Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes (STAMP) and Agent-based
modelling (ABM) are the most cited ones. STAMP is a qualitative analysis ap-
proach known for its thoroughness and comprehensiveness. Computational ABM
approach is a formal quantitative method which proved to be suitable for mod-
elling complex flexible systems. In addition, from a legal point of view, formal
systemic institutional modelling potentially provides an interesting contribution
to accident and incident analysis. The current work compares three systemic mod-
elling approaches: STAMP, ABM and institutional modelling applied to a case
study in an aviation domain.
Keywords: event models, norms, cognitive functioning, socio-technical systems
1 Introduction
Nowadays, technical systems and automation processes have penetrated almost all hu-
man organisations and this tendency is set to continue. Modern transportation systems,
and especially aviation and air traffic management, are characterised by a high degree
of complexity due to multiple human-technology couplings and their sophisticated in-
teractions. Safety analysis of such complex socio-technical systems (STSs) poses a real
challenge since it is shaped by multiple individual, social, technical and environmental
factors.
Air traffic management (ATM) typifies a complex socio-technical organisation where
humans and software systems are tightly coupled and interact in a complex manner. In
general, ATM is a highly organised, structured system with multiple control loops and
regulations. In spite of that, undesirable events such as accidents do occasionally occur
in this domain and numerous small incidents regularly occur. One of the characteristic
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features of this complexity is high time dynamics where several seconds or millisec-
onds might change the whole picture of events. Humans are very good in reasoning
about time aspects on a daily basis. However, if we deal with a system with multiple
distinctive components and their interdependencies, the necessity of formal automatic
reasoning and analysis of such systems is inevitable.
Traditionally, the analysis of such incidents is performed by safety experts using
fault and events trees [16], [41]. This approach is quite simplistic and does not allow a
full analysis with respect to a temporal dimension, neither is it powerful with respect
to a prospective analysis which empowers the designers of the whole system in at-
tempting to prevent future accidents or incidents.A systems approach towards accident
analyses within modern STSs, including aviation and ATM domain, is the most promis-
ing paradigm [40]. This paradigm tries to avoid the limitations of sequential accidents
models based on causal accident models. The systems approach views accidents as the
result of unexpected relationships between a system’s parts with the requirement that
systems are analysed as whole entities rather than consisting of isolated parts.
In the aviation safety literature, different accident analysis methods and models un-
derpinned by a systems-thinking paradigm are cited, such as AcciMap[29], Systems
Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes model (STAMP) [20], [21], Functional
Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) [15], agent-based modelling (ABM) approach
[4], [35], systems dynamics simulation [13]. There is a debate in different research
communities whether Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) [30], [31] can be characterised as a
systemic approach since it is being perceived as a sequential model rather than a holis-
tic approach capable of analysing emergent behaviour of complex STSs. These meth-
ods are developed within different research communities and frequently have different
methodological and conceptual roots which result in different knowledge representation
within the underlying models. Some of these methods, for example ABM and system
dynamics simulation, are formal as they utilise mathematical formalisms.
There is a strong need for formal modelling and safety analysis in modern STSs
[43] in order to understand their complexity. Formal modelling methods and techniques
have been widely applied to risk and safety analysis in aviation and other safety critical
domains, e.g. fault and event trees, ABM, Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN), [17], [2],
though not all formal approaches are systems-based. For safety analysis in complex
STSs from a legal perspective, another formal systems-based approach can be inter-
esting - institutional modelling developed in Artificial Intelligence (AI) domain. This
approach combines institutional theory [34] and computational reasoning. An exam-
ple of institutional modelling is the InstAL modelling language [14], which has been
successfully applied to the formal analysis of socio-technical organisations from an in-
stitutional perspective, including security analysis in organisations [28].
The landscape of all approaches towards accident analysis in aviation, including
systemic ones, can be roughly classified across two dimensions according to knowledge
representation: quantification (qualitative-quantitative) and mathematical formalisation
(formal-informal) – see Table 1. As can be seen in Table 1, safety analysis approaches
denoted with asterisks are spread across the two dimensions and occupy three quad-
rants: quantitative-formal, qualitative-formal and qualitative-informal. Data-driven sta-
tistical analysis is categorised as a quantitative-informal approach and various model
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Table 1. Safety analysis methods classification.
Quantitative Qualitative




Informal Descriptive statistics STAMP*, FRAM*, Accimap*
SCM
* Systemic methods
validation and verification techniques [33] are classified as qualitative-formal within
this framework.
There are several studies which compare different systems-based approaches. Fo
example, in [32] Accimap [29], the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS) approach [42] based on SCM and STAMP are compared. In [40] a compari-
son of STAMP with Accimap and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) ap-
proach [10] based on SCM is described. In both cases, the comparisons are done within
one quadrant of the methods classification framework: qualitative-informal. In [37], the
authors compare methods from two quadrants: fault tree, BBN and FRAM.
We believe that it is important to compare systemic methods with different positions
within the knowledge representation dimensions. This should help safety practitioners
and scientific communities form a wider view on systemic methods and to gain under-
standing of the diversity of these methods for the sake of broadening the safety analysis
repertoire and opening opportunities for systemic methods integration. Given the ar-
guments above, in the current work we address three quadrants within the knowledge
representation framework and compare the most frequently cited in literature methods
from two quadrants: STAMP within qualitative and informal, ABM within quantitative-
formal quadrant and an innovative safety analysis method from the qualitative-formal
quadrant: institutional modelling. Application of institutional modelling can be inter-
esting from the legal point of view. JAP: feel this needs some
substantiation and context;
sounds odd on its own hereThe institutional InstAL modelling language [14],[12] has been successfully applied
to the formal analysis of socio-technical organisations from an institutional perspective
in different domains: see for example [26] for the analysis of interactions between smart
phones and social networking platforms and [28] for the formal analysis of security and
legal policies in organisations. JAP: at the risk over-citing
me (indirectly), there’s a pa-
per by Tingting [23] and her
thesis [22]
The ABM paradigm, expressed in terms of the Temporal Trace Language (TTL)
models in conjunction with the LEADSTO sublanguage were previously applied in for-
mal safety analysis of human functions in the aviation domain [5,7]. The main findings
of these exploratory studies revealed the feasibility and effectiveness of formal retro-
spective analysis of accidents and incidents in TTL/LEADSTO language, which has
the potential to substantially improve the quality of safety analysis in (aviation) trans-
portation and other safety critical socio-technical organisations, e.g. in nuclear power,
pharmacology and healthcare domains. The TTL/LEADSTO language allows for hy-
brid qualitative and quantitative knowledge representation and covers two quadrants
within the classification framework in Table 1. The TTL/LEADSTO models take the
agent-based perspective which implies that an incident is caused by complex interac-
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tions between different agents in the organisation. Specifically, in the domain of aviation
safety, there is another formal agent-based approach proposed in [4,38]. However, this
formal analysis uses probabilistic modelling to quantify aircraft collision risks given
particular configurations of agents and their environment. Due to the stochastic nature
of processes modelled by this approach, the behaviour of the resulting models is not
transparent and intuitive and it is difficult to track the behaviour of individual agents
within them. In contrast, logic-based accident modelling and analysis might be a useful
tool to analyse the emergence of safety issues in such socio-technical organisations due
to the presence of qualitative and hence unambiguous and straightforward information
representation, that can be easily processed both by humans and software agents.
The main goal of this paper is to compare the capabilities of three different inci-
dent and accident analysis approaches in aviation: (i) qualitative and informal CAST
analysis based on STAMP; (ii) formal ABM approach represented by the hybrid qual-
itative/quantitative TTL/LEADSTO modelling language; and (iii) formal institutional
modelling represented by the qualitative InstAL modelling language. We compare these
approaches, with their different knowledge representation, in order to provide a wider
view on systemic methods and to explore the potential of systemic accident analysis
methods integration. The comparison is done by an application of the three approaches
to the incident case study described in[5,7].
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 a comparison
framework is described, then a case study which was modelled according to the three
approaches is presented in Section 3. A more detailed description of all three approaches
is given in Section 4, while Section 5 analyses outcomes according to the three ap-
proaches are presented. A evaluative comparison of the methods is given in Section 6.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the work.
2 Comparison aspects
In order to model and analyse behaviour of complex transportation systems, such as
ATM, from global and local perspectives, the selected modelling approaches should
fulfil certain requirements that may serve as criteria for assessing their suitability for
performing the analysis. In the literature on safety analysis approaches, various analy-
sis requirements are mentioned and different modelling approaches classifications and
taxonomies are proposed. For example, Le Coze [19] addresses organisational dimen-
sion of accidents and classifies approaches according to a two dimensional framework
with a level of abstraction (micro-meso-macro) and relations with data (normative ver-
sus descriptive). Netjasov and Janic [25] classify approaches towards safety modelling
in aviation into the following types according to the type, goals and context of mod-
elling: causal models for risk and safety assessment, collision risk models, human error
models and third party risk models. Lundberg et al [24] classify accident models into
simple linear system models (cause-effect models), complex linear system models –
epidemiological approach (e.g. Swiss cheese [30]), complex interactions, performance
variability [15]. The authors also mention various scopes of accident analyses addressed
by different approaches: human, technology, organisation and information availability.
Benner [3] proposes ten criteria for accident model evaluation: models must be real-
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istic, definitive, satisfying, comprehensive, disciplining, consistent, direct, functional,
non-causal, visible. Sklet [36] compares 14 selected methods for accident investigation
and proposes a framework for their comparison. The framework includes the following
aspects of a safety approach: provision of a complete understanding of the events lead-
ing to the accident; preferable graphical description of the accident sequence; demon-
stration how safety barriers influenced the accident; complexity reflected according to
a classification of a socio-technical system involved in safety, comprising multiple lev-
els (technical system, staff, management, company, regulators and Government); type
of an underlying accident model used; primary or a secondary method; the need for
education and training in order to use the method (expert, specialist or novice).
Salmon et al. [32] compare Accimap, HFACS (Human Factors Analysis and Clas-
sification System) – based on Swiss cheese – and STAMP. The authors mention the
following comparison aspects: output of the model, model structure and taxonomy of
failures, approach comprehensiveness, linkage of failures between and within the lev-
els of analysis, reliability (between different analysts), domain independence, context
consideration. Underwood and Waterson [40] compare ATSB (Swiss cheese based),
Accimap and STAMP approaches. The compared approaches were evaluated against
two topics of interest: coverage of systems theory concepts and usage characteristics.
Within the first criteria (systems thinking), the following comparison subcriteria were
identified: system structure, component relationship, system behaviour (input, outputs,
feedback mechanisms); within the second topic: data requirements, validity and reliabil-
ity, usability (training resources), graphical representation. Altabbakh et al [1] demon-
strate that the STAMP approach focuses on a holistic system. The authors also state
that the method goes beyond human performance factors and adds organisational hier-
archy, working practices and roles. Moreover, it considers all levels of complex systems
including environment, human error, physical component failure, the context, also in-
terrelationships between components of the system. JAP: this and the preceding
paragraph are good in terms
of literature cited, but they
are mostly descriptive and
lack analysis. Perhaps that
is intentional, but I suggest
it would help to ensure that
reader expectations are prop-
erly set up at the beginning
of the section with some mo-
tivation and the outcome,
e.g. how it leads to the next
paragraph that describes the
proposal.
Taking into account the models’ classifications and accident approaches evaluation
criteria mentioned above and approaches classification framework described in Section
1, we propose the following incident analysis methods evaluation framework within
complex socio-technical organisations:
1. Levels of analysis: an approach can address a certain level of granularity of pro-
cesses and actors, either a micro level, like human factors approach or agent-based
modelling, or a more global level of organisations and organisational units – a
meso-macro level – that includes for example organisational structure, policies,
norms and regulations. There exists a methodological difficulty in connecting mul-
tiple levels of analysis in one framework since different granularities are based on
different conceptual roots and different definition of contexts under study [19].
2. Taxonomy of failures: One may argue that having a fixed taxonomy of failures
within an approach will restrict the possibilities of failures beyond this taxonomy
while performing analysis. However, it is important to have a taxonomy in order
to be able to compare different approaches and from the scientific point of view, to
improve the transparency and reproducibility of a method.
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3. Quantitative representation: In some contexts, it is important to quantify concepts
under analysis in order to provide a clear picture of events and processes and to be
able to represent different variables of interest.
4. Qualitative representation: an ability of a method to provide a clear qualitative
framework for reasoning about systems’ operations and possible failures
5. Formal semantics: the existence of a formal semantics behind a method which
utilises mathematical models for analysis and verification. This criteria will al-
low for formal specification and automatic property checking not only for software
technical systems where it has traditionally been deployed, but in order to expand
it to the analysis of complex socio-technical systems where complexity cannot be
tackled by non-formal methods only.
6. Events representation: people are comfortable with reconstructing an incident as
a chain of events, it helps to create a clear picture of an incident from a perspec-
tive of an external observer, so in many case it is important to have this type of
representation within a method
7. Time dynamics expressiveness: the capability an approach to represent the time
dynamics of organisational and local actors’ processes
8. Amount of training: the amount of training needed for a typical safety expert not
familiar with the approach to learn it
9. Graphical representation: effective visualisation of modelling results within an ap-
proach
10. Data requirements: the amount of and ease of access to the data needed for an
application of an approach
11. Time resources: the amount of time needed for analysis given a person who per-
forms analysis is already trained in an application of a method
12. Additional resources (software etc): additional resources needed for performing
safety analysis, it can be IT technologies (software, hardware), also access to or-
ganisational archives and reports, collaborations with other experts etc.
13. Main versus complementary method: this criteria defines whether an approach is
stand-alone and can be applied for full safety analysis process or it rather strength-
ens or complements other safety analysis approaches
We did not aim for a particular number of aspects, rather the 13 items above emerged
from an analysis of the literature. The list of the aspects for comparison can be roughly
divided into two groups: aspects 1–7 roughly correspond to the expressive power of
models and approaches; while aspects 8–13 refer to the practical usage of methods. The
current comparison framework is based in part on the previously published work of the
authors [6].Note that the order of the evaluation aspects listed above does not strictlyJAP: need to make clear in
what respects it builds on/en-
hances, in order to differenti-
ate, nd why
represent the importance of these aspects. Depending on the nature, context and main
goals of incident investigation, relative importance of different aspects of methods can
vary.
3 Case Study
A specific case study in the domain of ATM has been modelled following three differ-
ent approaches in order to get more insight into the expressive capabilities, strengths
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Fig. 1. Schematic overview of the case study.
and weaknesses of the approaches. The case study consists of (a simplification of) an
existing scenario in the context of a runway incursion incident that occurred in 1995,
described in more detail in [5]. A schematic overview of the scenario is provided in
Figure 1, while the summary follows:
Scenario: The Airbus was preparing for the departure. It was supposed to taxi to runway 03 in
the north-east direction. The Airbus received permission to taxi and started taxiing to its runway.
Approximately at the same time, a military Hercules aircraft that was ready for the departure as
well received permission to taxi in the north-west direction from its parking gate. The Hercules
was supposed to take off from runway 36 that crossed with runway 03 that was designated for
the Airbus. Both aircraft were taxiing to their runways. During the taxiing, the Airbus received
its flight route from the air traffic controllers. Some time later, when the Airbus was near the
runway designated for taking off, it switched from the taxiing radio frequency to the frequency
of the Tower and received permission to line up on the assigned runway. The Hercules was still
at the taxiing radio frequency and also received permission to line up, while at the same time
the Airbus received permission to take off at the radio frequency of the Tower. However, due to
unknown reasons 3, the Hercules pilot interpreted his permission for lining up as permission for
taking off and started taking off on runway 36. As a result of this mistake of the pilot of the
Hercules, two aircraft were taking off simultaneously on crossing runways, and none of the crews
were aware of that. The air traffic controllers in the Tower observed the conflicting situation and
communicated a STOP signal to the pilot-in-command of the Airbus, while the Airbus was still on
the ground (but at high speed). The pilot had to make a quick decision about the termination of
the take-off as there is a point in this process that one cannot safely do this anymore. After having
analysed the situation, the pilot-in-command of the Airbus gave a command to the co-pilot (who
controlled the aircraft) to abort the take-off and start braking on the runway. During braking, the
crew of the Airbus saw the Hercules flying close in the air above their own aircraft at a distance
of about 5 meters. A serious collision was prevented.
3 This misinterpretation might be explained by the fact that the pilot of the Hercules got used to
the routine procedure of taxiing from the same military parking place at this airport where the
line up clearance was often immediately followed by the take off clearance.
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4 Safety Analysis Approaches
This section provides a short introduction and overview of each of the three approaches
that are the subjects of the comparison.
4.1 STAMP: CAST
The Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) methodology [21] is
based on systems and control theory. According to STAMP, the analysis and manage-
ment of any emergent property of a socio-technical system is, in its essence, a control
problem. To deal with this problem, STAMP incorporates a number of tools that help
analysts generate scenarios, define specifications and explain how inadequate control,
in relation to an unwanted deviation of a system emergent property, could happen. In
this methodology, an accident is not understood in terms of a series of events, but rather
as the result of a lack of control or the constraints imposed on the system design and op-
erations. The STAMP approach is also an example of systemic accident modelling that
treats an accident as a result of failure of an entire system [21]. The approach comprises
several steps according to the STAMP-based CAST methodology [21]: 1) Identify the
systems hazards involved in the loss; 2) Identify the systems safety constraints; 3) Doc-
ument the safety control structure; 4) Determine the proximate events leading to the
loss; 5) Analyse the loss at the physical system level; 6) Analyse how each successive
higher level of the system contributed to the inadequate control at a lower level; 7) Ex-
amine overall coordination and communication between the elements of the system; 8)
Determine the dynamics and changes in the system and the safety control structure; 9)
Generate recommendations. The analysis process is non-linear and there are no strictly
defined requirements that one step must be completed before the next one is started.
The present study will focus on the first seven steps of the analysis. In addition, accord-
ing to the STAMP accident analysis methodology, each component of the system is
described in terms of the following characteristics: safety requirements and constraints,
controls, context (e.g., roles and responsibilities, environmental and behaviour-shaping
factors), dysfunctional interactions and failures, reasons for the flawed control actions
and dysfunctional interactions (e.g., control algorithm flaws, incorrect process models,
inadequate coordination or communication, reference channel flaws, feedback flaws).
4.2 Agent-Based Modelling: TTL and LEADSTO
The predicate-logical Temporal Trace Language (TTL) is a hybrid language which in-
tegrates qualitative, logical aspects and quantitative, numerical aspects[8]. This integra-
tion allows the modeller to express dynamic properties at different levels of aggregation,
which makes it well suited both for simulation and logical analysis. The TTL language
is based on the assumption that dynamics can be described as an evolution of states
over time. The notion of state as used here is characterised on the basis of an ontology
defining a set of physical and/or mental (state) properties that do or do not hold at a
certain point in time. These properties are often called state properties to distinguish
them from dynamic properties that relate different states over time. A specific state is
characterised by dividing the set of state properties into those that hold, and those that
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do not hold in the state. To formalise dynamic properties, explicit reference is made
to time points and to traces (i.e., sequences of states). They are expressed by temporal
statements using the standard first-order logical connectives and quantifiers.
To be able to perform (pseudo-)experiments, only part of the expressivity of TTL
is needed. To this end, the executable LEADSTO language described in [9] has been
defined as a sublanguage of TTL, with the specific purpose to develop simulation mod-
els in a declarative manner. In LEADSTO, direct temporal dependencies between two
state properties in successive states are modelled by executable dynamic properties.
The LEADSTO format is defined as follows. Let α and β be state properties as defined
above. Let α and β be successive state properties, then, α⇒e,f,g,h β means:
If state property α holds for a certain time interval with duration g, then after some
delay(between e and f) state property β will hold for a certain time interval of length h.
More details on the TTL and LEADSTO languages are available in [9,8].
4.3 Institutional modelling: InstAL
InstAL was developed for institutional modelling [12]. It is an action language that fol-
lows the traditions of the Event Calculus [18]. The generic institutional model expressed
by InstAL has the following characteristics (summarised from [27]):
1. It distinguishes between external world and internal institutional events. The former
act as triggers for institutional action, while the latter can have associated permis-
sion and power to reflect whether an action is allowed and whether the performance
of some action has an institutional effect.
2. The generation relation G implements the institutional state dependent recognition
of a world event as an institutional event.
3. The consequence relation C, triggered by an institutional event, implements the
institutional state dependent addition or deletion of (inertial) facts.
4. In addition, there are rules for non-inertial facts such that each is true only if some
associated condition over the institutional state is true. This allows for the recogni-
tion of situations whose constituent facts may be initiated or terminated by events
at different points in time.
The institutional state comprises four kinds of facts, namely those pertaining to the
Domain being modelled, Permissions and PoWers associated with actions and Obligations
arising from actions. Although the approach has similarities with the Event Calculus,
there are two main differences: (i) InstAL uses a two-level event structure where exter-
nal events generate (possibly multiple) institutional events which initiate and terminate
institutional facts, and (ii) the computational model is realized in Answer Set Prolog
rather than conventional Prolog, which allows exploration of all possible traces over a
finite number of steps or just a single step institutional evaluation. A detailed description
of the model and the language is given in [12] and in [11].
5 Case Study Analysis
The runway incursion scenario described in section 3 was modelled according to the
three different safety analysis approaches: STAMP, Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) and
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Fig. 2. General hierarchical safety control structure for the case study.
institutional modelling. As concrete examples of each of the approaches, CAST analysis
was selected for STAMP approach, TTL in conjunction with LEADSTO language for
ABM and the InstAL language for institutional modelling. The three models’ outcomes
are described in the following subsections.
5.1 CAST Model
First, the general hierarchical control structure of air traffic operations in the country
of the incident was constructed according to steps 3 and 7 of CAST technique listed in
subsection 4.1, starting from the government down to the aircraft (see 2).
The rectangles correspond to actors at different levels of aggregation. Control flows
are represented by the solid or dotted lines and communication flow by the dashed
lines. At the highest level of this structure, the International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO) provides international standards for air traffic operations and communications.
These guidelines are considered by local governments of the member-countries of the
ICAO. Eurocontrol is a European organisation that provides safety guidelines for air
traffic operations in Europe. The country where the incident occurred is a member of
Eurocontrol. Recommendations concerning air traffic safety should be adopted by the
Systemic Approaches to incident analysis in aviation 11
























Fig. 3. Proximate safety control structure based on the general control structure.
governments of country-members of Eurocontrol. The government of the country par-
ticipates in the decision-making processes that take part within the ICAO and Eurocon-
trol. This government provides the guidelines of the policy concerning transportation
and funding for the airport and air traffic control organisations within the country. At a
lower level, the Ministry of Transport and Communications is responsible for making
uniform rules and standards for air traffic operations and functioning of airports. Air
navigation providers are responsible for work instructions, procedures and guidelines
regarding functioning for air traffic controllers, while airports provide the facilities for
air traffic controllers. Pilots are directly controlled by air traffic controllers that commu-
nicate clearances for different operations to the pilots. The operating process of steering
aircraft (see bottom of Figure 2) is directly controlled by the pilots, using sensors and
actuators. Airlines execute control over their pilots by means of setting general guide-
lines for the adherence for procedures and for aircraft exploitation. These guidelines are
in turn provided by the government of the country in question. The connection between
the government and the airlines is represented by a dotted line in Figure 2, as the airlines
company may be from another country.
Taking this general control structure into consideration along with the proximate
events (in space and time) leading to the incident, a specific control structure for the
incident was constructed (steps 4 and 5 described in Section 4.1); see Figure 3. In this
structure there are two proximate operating processes: pilots controlling the Airbus and
pilots controlling the Hercules. Tower controllers are involved for giving instructions
and commands to the pilots of both aircraft during the incident. The Airport Flight Op-
eration Management department of the airport communicates flight schedule changes
to the controllers and in collaboration with the Air Navigation Provider Management it
defines runway usage depending on traffic flow, weather conditions and work activities
in the airport.
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Hercules Pilot Safety requirements and constraints
1. Ensure safety of the aircraft, its crew, cargo and passengers while piloting
aircraft
2. Complete a thorough pre-flight inspection of the aircraft
3. Ensure all safety systems are working properly
4. Ensure all information on the route, weather, passengers and aircraft is received
5. Calculate the required runway distance depending on the weather conditions
6. Consider the effects of wind and engine performance on the aircraft’s fuel burn
to ensure it reaches its destination safely
7. Ensure the fuel levels balance safety with economy and supervise loading and
fuelling of the aircraft
8. Complete flight plans taking all information into consideration
9. Communicate with air traffic control before take-off and during flight and
landing
10. Brief the cabin crew before the flight and maintaining regular contact
throughout the flight
11. Report and communicate problems arising during flight to air traffic controllers
12. Ensure compliance of all laws and regulations
13. Know all limitations applicable to the aircraft (max airspeeds for gear and flaps,
max takeoff & landing weights, max temps for the engines, etc)
14. Understand and interpret data from instruments and controls
15. Understand and interpret instructions of air traffic controllers
16. Follow commands of air traffic controllers
17. Make regular checks on the aircraft’s technical performance and position, on
weather conditions and air traffic during flight
18. Communicate with passengers using the public address system
19. React quickly and appropriately to environmental changes and emergencies
Context
1. Routine take off procedure at this non-busy European airport created an
expectation that a line-up clearance is immediately followed by take off
clearance Inadequate control actions
2. Non-compliance to take off procedure rules: pilot did not ensure that the read
back of take off clearance was received by the tower controller
Mental Model Flaws
1. Interpretation of line-up clearance as take off clearance
The following safety constraint on the whole system according to step 1 of the
CAST methodology was identified: “The system safety control structure must prevent
collision of aircraft”. To achieve that, a safe aircraft separation should be maintained
according to existing standards. This entails two main lower level constraints (step 2):
1) Air traffic controllers should monitor traffic flow, make plans and give instructions to
the pilots, ensuring that the instructions are interpreted properly; 2) Pilots should follow
the commands of air traffic controllers and ensure that the commands are read back.
Further analysis was performed to investigate the roles of human agents in maintaining
the system’s safety.
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The key human components depicted in Figure 3 were selected for further analy-
sis (steps 6 and 7): Airport Flight Operations Management, Air Navigation Provider
Management, Tower Controllers, Airbus Pilot and Hercules pilot. For these compo-
nents, their safety requirements and constraints, context, inadequate control actions and
mental model flaws were identified. For the sake of brevity, only one example of this
analysis – for the Hercules Pilot component – is shown in the Hercules Pilot box.
5.2 LEADSTO Model
This subsection presents an agent-based simulation model of the scenario in the LEAD-
STO language, which consists of a number of executable dynamic properties (EPs).
The runway incursion scenario is modelled from the agent perspective with a focus
on agents’ observations, beliefs and communications. This model can generate a va-
riety of alternative traces by changes to initial parameter settings. As the first step to-
wards the formalisation of the incident, formal domain ontology was developed in TTL.
The ontology includes several sorts (e.g. AGENT, AIRCRAFT, RUNWAY), subsorts re-
lations, elements of sorts (e.g. airbus and hercules are instances of AIRCRAFT)
and logical predicates over sorts. Then executable dynamic properties were defined.
Figure 4 gives some examples of executable properties in formal LEADSTO notation
(for simplicity, the time parameters have been left out). During the modelling process
all properties have been conceptually divided into different categories related to agents
characteristics: properties related to agents’ observations, beliefs, communications and
actions. For example, property EP1 refers to agents beliefs and states that, if an agent
receives an instruction I1, while it has a strong expectation to receive a similar, but
slightly different instruction I2, it will believe that it actually did receive I2. This prop-
erty can be used to model the fact that the Hercules pilot interpreted his permission for
line up as permission for take off. Property EP2 refers to agents communication and
determines when the Tower agent communicates a permission to start taxiing to the
different aircraft.
The above properties were expressed in LEADSTO language. An execution of the
LEADSTO program produces only one trace. An example trace representing the sce-
nario is given in Figure 5, while a more detailed description of the LEADSTO and
TTL models and simulation results can be found in [5,7]. In Figure 5, the horizon-
tal axis is time and the vertical axis lists the states that hold in the world. To avoid
over-crowding, the atoms that represent observations and beliefs of the agents are not
shown. xsHercules misinterprets the line up command from the tower and initiates
take off without take off clearance, as illustrated byperformed(hercules_pilot,
take_off_from (runway_36)) that holds from time point 15 until time point 21.
There is no atom that states that take off clearance from the Tower is communicated to
the Hercules. At the same time, the clearance for take-off is given to the Airbus aircraft
that almost simultaneously initiates take off from the crossing runway at time point
20. The Tower observes the conflict situation (this atom is not shown in the trace) and
communicates a “STOP” signal to the Airbus at time point 24. As a result, the pilot
of the Airbus aborts the take-off at time point 27 and a severe collision is prevented
by this event. It is an example of a case when a hazardous situation created by one
wrong action of one agent can be corrected by another action of another agent. If atom
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EP1 – Communication
misinterpretation
incoming communication(A:Agent, I1:Action, R:Roadway)
& belief(A:Agent, similarity(I1: Action, I2: Action))
& I1 6= I2
& expectation(A:Agent, I2:Action)
→ belief(A:Agent, I2:Action, R:Roadway)
EP2 – Tower: Taxiing
request communication
belief(A:Agent, is at position(B:Aircraft, S: Startingpoint))
& belief(A:Agent, is adjacent to(T:Taxiway, S: Startingpoint))
& belief(A:Agent, is available(T:Taxiway))
& belief(A:Agent, has role(tower))
→ communicate from to(A:Agent, B:Aircraft,
start taxiing(T:Taxiway))




There is no trace m, with time points t1, t2, agents a1, a2, and
runways r1, r2, such that agent a1 performs a take-off on runway r1
at time t1 and agent a2 performs a take-off on runway r2 at time t2
and runway r1 and r2 cross and the difference between t1 and t2 is
less than or equal to d.
Formally:
¬∃m:TRACE : ∃ t1,t2:TIME, a1,a2:AGENT, r1,r2:RUNWAY
state(m, t1) |= performed(a1, take off from(r1))
state(m, t2) |= performed(a2, take off from(r2))
state(m, t1) |= world state(crossing ways(r1, r2))
| t1− t2 |≤ d
Fig. 4. Examples of properties captured in the LEADSTO model
expectation(hercules_pilot, start_take_off) is removed from the initial
declarations, a different simulation scenario is generated where Hercules does not ini-
tiate the wrong take off action. By means of changing some time parameters or initial
states, the LEADSTO model can be used for the exploration of hypothetical ’what-if’
scenarios.
For the purpose of model verification, various global dynamic properties for this
organisation are formalised, and implemented in the TTL Checker tool which allows
for automatic verification of the properties of interest over the LEADSTO trace(s). In
this particular case, a number of higher level properties of the trace in Figure 5 are
checked. One example of a global property in a semiformal and formal notation is
GP1 in Figure 4. The property expresses one safety related constraint imposed on the
organisation: there should be no take-offs within the same time interval on crossing
runways. This property does not hold in the given trace since the take-offs of Hercules
and Airbus occur within the same time interval.
5.3 InstAL Model
We now describe the formalisation and implementation of the aviation incident sce-
nario in InstAL. Like LEADSTO, which uses temporal logic, the basic concepts are
expressed in InstAL as predicates that can be derived from other properties. Entities
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Fig. 5. LEADSTO trace shows hercules taking off without take off clearance.
within predicates are variables that are instantiated according to the domain declara-
tions. Thus, in the examples below A is of type Agent, which is either hercules1
or airbus1; Roadway represents one of the modelled roadways and is instantiated
from the following set: {taxiway1, taxiway2, runway1, runway2}. Three
agent actions are modelled: {taxi, lineUp, takeOff}. The focus of the InstAL
model is on the violation of organisational norms rather than on the occurrence of
(world) events, since InstAL emphasises how external events change the state of the
institutional model. For this reason, the InstAL formalisation considers the violation
of institutional norms by the Hercules agent and is limited to modelling the behaviour
of two agents: hercules1 and airbus1. The model demonstrates which sequence of
events may lead to state conflict(Agent1, Agent2) that compromises organisa-
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tional safety. The state of conflict may be caused by a combination of various other
states. Here it is defined as a disjunction of two situations:
1 conflict(Agent1, Agent2) when situation1(Agent1,Agent2);
2 conflict(Agent1, Agent2) when situation2(Agent1,Agent2);
Situation1 occurs when both agents are in a lining up state on the crossing runways
and Situation2 occurs when one of the agents is in a lining up state and the other one
in a taking off state on the crossing runways:




5 situation2(Agent1,Agent2) when crossing(Taxiway1,Taxiway2),
6 liningUp(Agent1, Runway1),
7 takingOff(Agent2, Runway2);
An example of a rule where line up clearance event lclearance(A, Action)
initiates lining up and hold before runway states liningUp(A, Roadway), rhold(
A, Roadway) is:JAP: can’t parse this sentence
1 lclearance(A, Action) initiates
2 liningUp(A, Roadway), rhold(A, Roadway)
3 if hold(A, Roadway), runway(Roadway), not conflict(A, A2);
The InstAL model offers the possibility to explore which events sequences lead to the
state of conflict. The answer set solving process first grounds the model over all
values that the variables can take. While, this allows for an exhaustive analysis of all
possible events in all possible orders, many of the traces do not make sense or are not
of interest. By specifying a range of constraints, the grounding process is constrained
and the number of traces can be reduced to those of interest. In this specific example
we defined the constraints to grasp the situation where a particular sequence of events
takes place.
We are interested in the trace of length 7 with 7 events: at time 0 hercules1 re-
ceives clearance to taxi, at time 1 airbus receives clearance to taxi, then hercules and
airbus stop before their runways, they receive lining up clearance further and, finally,
at time point 6 hercules enters runway2. These event sequence constraints result in the
construction of only one trace shown in Figure 6: this shows external and institutional
events (in italics) and time instants denoted by Si. The states that are initiated at time in-
stants are in bold and the terminated states are struck through. The taxi clearance events
at the beginning of the trace are omitted to enhance readability. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 6, entering the runway by hercules1 is evaluated as an institutional violation of
rules. Moreover, the conflict(airbus1, hercules1) fluent holds at time instants
S6 and S7. It is caused by the two conflict situations: situation1 when two airplanes
line up on the crossing runways and situation2 when hercules initiates take of at
time instant S6.
An alternative visualisation of the trace, that is more similar to the LEADSTO
model appears in Figure 7. Here the dark bars represent the states (or facts) that are
























































































































































































































Fig. 6. InstAL trace showing the violation of an institutional norm: Hercules initiates take off
without take off clearance, indicated by the violation arising from enterRunway occurring at
time 6 and the identified conflict arising from hercules1 takingOff in S6.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
trequest(hercules1, taxi, taxiway1): atm



























Fig. 7. InstAL trace shows the violation of an institutional norm: hercules initiates take off without
take off clearance, indicated by the violation arising from enterRunway occurring at time 6 and
the presence of hercules1 takingOff in states 6 and 7 (key events/states are highlighted in red).
initiated and terminated across 8 time instances and black diamonds represent insti-
tutional events. If the initial fact that Hercules pilot has the expectation of take-off
clearance immediately after line up clearance is removed, it results in a trace with only
one type of conflict fluent – the one that is caused by situation1, when two air-
planes line up on crossing runways. By changing initial conditions or conditions of the
rules where states are initiated or terminated by events in this model, one can explore
how undesirable, safety-compromising states can be achieved or prevented from occur-
ring. One should note, however, that the external events are deterministic and cannot
be prevented from happening in the model, only state occurrence can be influenced by
changing initial facts and by adding or removing conditions in rules.
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6 Comparative Analysis of Results
The models developed according to the three approaches represent the occurrence of an
incident from slightly different perspectives, which have their advantages and disadvan-
tages. We put forward a brief summary of the main differences between the approaches
according to the selected aspects relevant for the scope of the current work. A brief
overview of the methods’ performance within these selected aspects is presented in Ta-
ble 2. We used the following notation within the Table: “++” represents an excellent
performance of the method given an aspect of evaluation, “+” represents good perfor-
mance, “+/-” stands for a moderate satisfaction of a comparison criteria, “-” denotes
poor satisfaction and “--” represents very poor satisfaction.
1. Levels of analysis: CAST method is the most comprehensive in this respect as
STAMP methodology covers all levels of analysis, starting from the roles of in-
dividuals components and going up to a macro level of an organisation and taking
even a broader context at a governmental and regulatory level. LEADSTO as an
example of agent-based modelling approach produces a model at a micro level of
individual agents without an explicit overview of meso and macro levels; InstAL
represents both agents and institutional events and norms.
2. Taxonomy of failures: CAST method was specifically designed to analyse safety
critical systems and provides a taxonomy of failures within the STAMP framework;
LEADSTO produces a model with emergent system’s behaviour which is not very
concretely defined in the beginning and this has no predefined taxonomy of failures;
InstAL represents failures as a violation of organisational norms which in some
sense does provide a taxonomy of failures.
3. Quantitative representation: Here only LEADSTO has an ability to express quanti-
tative concepts, such as mathematical formulas, numbers and probabilities, though
in the current model this capability was not utilised given the nature of safety issues
within the case study under consideration; both CAST and InstAL do not incorpo-
rate numerical expressions or mathematical formulas
4. Qualitative representation: in this respect, all three methods are able to provide a
qualitative representation of factors leading to an incident
5. Time dynamics expressiveness: Regarding the time dynamics expressivity which is
one of the most important aspects of the given domain, LEADSTO/TTL appeared
to be more expressive in this respect since it has quantitative time parameters that
regulate temporal dependences between states; InstAL does not have such parame-
ters, though facts initiation in InstAL always occurs immediately after the event oc-
currence and facts duration is regulated by other events occurrences in a sequence;
CAST and STAMP framework does not focus on time dynamics, but rather on a
static design and structure of a system with proper feedback and control loops
6. Events representation: here InstAL has a very clear events representation advantage
while LEADSTO has a moderate representation which is mixed with agents’ states,
perceptions and actions; CAST does not focus on this aspect as it is clearly related
to time aspect and STAMP framework does not consider situational time dynamics
context
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7. Formal semantics: both InstAL and LEADSTO methods have formal semantics
behind them which allows for formal specification and automatic property checking
which can be crucial for modern socio-technical systems where complexity cannot
be tackled by non-formal methods only; note that not all agent-based approaches
satisfy this criteria and there are some methods which are used for pure simulation
of events without any automatic verification or property checking; CAST is not
underpinned by formal semantics
8. Amount of training: in this respect we admit that CAST outperforms the other
two methods because apart from systems thinking, for an application of LEAD-
STO/TTL and InstAL some background training in programming and computa-
tion is needed; however, from a point of view of safety experts specialised in ar-
eas different from engineering (e.g. human factors), none of the methods is easily
comprehensible - this conclusion is drawn based on conversations with human fac-
tors focused safety experts and based on social and exact sciences interdisciplinary
background of one of the co-authors of the current paper
9. Graphical representation: both CAST and InstAL have different types of visuali-
sation of modelling results and outcomes while LEADSTO has only one type of
visualisation which is not easily comprehensible for someone not familiar with an
approach
10. Data requirements: since CAST comprises all levels of analysis, from micro to
macro, it requires more data to complete this comprehensive analysis; data require-
ments for LEADSTO and InstAL models are lower since they do not focus on all
levels
11. Time resources: all three methods are quite time consuming due to either the amount
of data for processing (CAST) or due to the amount of time needed for models con-
struction, programming or running simulations (LEADSTO and InstAL)
12. Additional resources (software etc): CAST analysis does not require any additional
resources apart from access to organisational archives and reports, organisational
structure and hierarchy which might be easily accessible by an internal safety ex-
pert, though quite problematic for an external expert given company confidentiality
issues; both LEADSTO and InstAL require IT technologies: dedicated software
packages and a computer to run it on: specifically, InstAL requires several pieces
of diverse software
13. Main versus complementary method: given the coverage of all levels of analysis by
CAST method and STAMP framework, it can be used as a stand-alone approach
and can be applied for full safety analysis process; as far as LEADSTO and InstAL
concern, they can rather strengthen, complement or be utilised within other safety
analysis approaches using their framework, inclusive STAMP
Table 2 provides a concise summary of the evaluation of the three approaches.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to compare and contrast three systemic approaches for incident
and accident analysis in aviation through their application to the analysis of a case study
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Table 2. Approaches evaluation according to the specified aspects
Aspect CAST TTL/LEADSTO InstAL
1. Levels of analysis ++ (all) -(micro) +/- (micro/meso)
2. Taxonomy of failures + - +/-
3. Quantitative representation - + -
4. Qualitative representation + + +
5. Formal semantics - + +
6. Events representation - + ++
7. Time dynamics - ++ +
8. Amount of training +/- - -
9. Graphical representation + - +
10. Data requirements +/- + +
11. Time recourses - - -
12. Additional resources (software etc) + - --
13. Main vs complementary main compl compl
incident in air traffic management. The selected approaches of (i) STAMP-based CAST
analysis; (ii) LEADSTO simulation based on agent-based modelling; and (iii) InstAL
model underpinned by institutional modelling; were applied to a real-life case study in
the aviation domain. Apart from focusing on the most influential systemic approaches
in safety literature, we deliberately selected qualitatively different approaches in terms
of their data representation and the presence of mathematical formalisms, in order to
explore not only their differences, but also their potential complementarity. An applica-
tion of formal institutional modelling to safety analysis in transportation is innovative
here. This type of modelling is widely applied in legal reasoningand opens an interest- JAP: are there any citations
to support this elsewhere in
the paper? if not, may be
criticised
ing perspective for accident or incident analysis from a legal point of view.
In terms of an accident analysis itself, all three methods allow for qualitative rep-
resentation of an incident, although two of them, TTL/LEADSTO and InstAL, have
underlying formal semantics which empower these approaches to perform automatic
checking and verification of complex systems where incidents occur. TTL/LEADSTO
and InstAL are also capable of time dynamics modelling and representation which is
very important for this particular case study that represents a highly dynamic environ-
ment. STAMP-based CAST analysis comprises the analysis of a system at all organi-
sational levels, from actors at a micro level to governmental and regulatory bodies at a
macro level and is very comprehensive. From a usability point of view, it is clear that
a STAMP-based approach has advantages over TTL/LEADSTO and InstAL because it
requires less training and additional resources, such as dedicated software. Given the
scope of STAMP-based analysis, this approach can be used as a stand-alone accident
analysis approach by safety experts, while the other two can be regarded as comple-
mentary methods in order to gain insights into some specific behaviour of a systems,
rather than as a main approach for accident analysis. All three approaches are quite time
consuming, which can be a disadvantage when quick and practical results are expected
of a safety analyst.
No single method can be ideal and suitable for all possible contexts, depending on a
modelling purpose and the nature of an accident of an incident, a particular approach or
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a combination of several approaches can be considered. For example, for analysis of a
more closed and less dynamic system at all organisational levels, STAMP can be a good
option. For analysis of more complex, open and highly dynamic contexts, a complemen-
tary application of formal methods and simulation (especially for a prospective analysis
to predict future accidents) could be highly advantageous. To improve method capa-
bilities and expressive power, integrated approaches can be developed which combine
relevant complementary features of several different approaches. Integrated approaches
are recommended for the analysis of a series of complex incidents [32]. The current
paper provides a useful framework for this type of integration. For example, for a com-
prehensive safety analysis of complex socio-technical systems, formal methods can be
combined with a STAMP model.
In future, the possibilities of using such integrated approaches for safety analysis,
with the current case study and new case studies in ATM or other domains, will be
explored. Regarding the application of systemic methods in general by safety experts,
a serious research and practice gap exists [39], due to different contexts and goals in
which academic researchers and safety practitioners communities operate. Future re-
search should also address the possibilities of adoption and adjustment of existing sys-
temic methods for the needs of practitioners.
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